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1.

The C':;urt

err·-~i

l

ir1 denJllliJ 4e""t:·rl-

4ant's :~.otlon ror non-t\t1t and d1rtm1•·5al (Tr. 99) on the ;;round that the
9laiat1rr h.a4 tailed to p.rove .!n &lrtuemmt to pay rent, or ~:,,t,.ts on which to
b~ise ?n 1aplied agl'eement t\1 pay rent,
and the re~sonable rental value ot the
d&.."U~ec.t 1"r:'.)r:erty•••••••••••••• •....... 5
2.

-there is no e.v1denee in the -record

or any expreas agreement or the rum.iture CCtlpaay to paJ .eny~-rent nnd there
is no ~'Yidenee of ~'lP. rr3:nt~~ l value of
thfl' ~n··t?:d ses a.rter the rtreL or &llJ

evtdenee at all to sut>nort "1nd1na

Fact lo. 6 (Tr. ?4), ~hat

:rental

vr s

tne

18'75. J!) per 110nth, tt

f)t

~~r~ed
aad Find-

ins or Pact Mo. 9, {Tr. 25), readinfl
"The Court finds cenerally in ravor ot
the pla1nttrf eoryoT".~;tlon snd agai.nst
the det'endant corport:i:tlon."••••••••••• 17

3. !hat the-re 1s no finding or evi·
denee t.o support the Conclu~ion. of' La.v
No. 1, that pla1nt1rr is e:ntitle·d t.·; a
judpeat against the defendant in the

amount ot 11,'750.00 ••••••••••••••••••• 12
lu !h.~t the ~udpent ~.Wf<:rdi.ng ~,la.1n
t1 rr $1, '750.00, and ;t;26?. 50 t·Qterest,
it unsupported by U'l7 tY1denee or Find-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and ~Respondent,
Case No.
7459

vs.
CHRISTIANSEN FURNITURE
CO., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellam..t.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT
This action was filed hy the General Insurance
Company of America, hereinafter referred to as '' Insurance Company," against the Christiansen Furniture
Company, hereinafter referred to as ''Furniture Company,'' operating a retail furniture business at 66 South
Main Street in Salt Lake City. The basis of the complaint is a claim for rent claimed to have accrued during two months immediately following destruction of the
premises by a fire on May 2, 1946. The property is
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owned by the Rental Investment Company, a Utah
corporation, and was occupied by the defendant Furniture Company up to the date of the fire under an oral
month-to-month rental agreement; all rent was paid up
to the date of the fire.
The plaintiff Insurance Company paid the Rental
Investment Company under a rental insurance policy,
for loss of rent sustained by the Rental Investment
Company, owner of the said real estate, by reason
of the building being damaged by fire and the rental
use by the appellant furniture company being terminated. The plaintiff Insurance Company sues under
a subrogation agreement made in connection with the
issuance of its rental income insurance policy.
The appellant Furniture Company answered, admitting first the occupancy of the premises prior to the
fire ; second, the occurrence of the fire on May 2, 1946,
which fire rendered the place unfit for further use; and
third, denying that defendant and appellant became
obligated to pay any rent whatsoever after the date of
the said fire.
For some time prior to the fire, the premises had
been adapted to the use of the Furniture Company and
used as a retail furniture store, under a month-to-month
oral agreement to pay $875.00 per month.
There was no lease, or obligation on the Furniture
Company to occupy the premises for any specific time or
period. The fire occurred in the early morning of May
2, and the owner of the premises, Rental Investment
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Company, requested the Furniture Company to hold
eYerything in the pre~nises so as to help in protecting
the prop€rty until fire adjustment insurance claims
could be handled.
The premises were rendered wholly unfit for further
use as a retail furniture store. Remodelling of the whole
building was in contemplation. The appellant Furniture Company moved to another building all of its books
and records, and kept only a desk in the store, with
signs and an attendant directing people to another building where the office was .established after the fire. On
one occasion, for two days, the appellant Furniture
Company conducted a fire ~sale in the premises.
The Rental Investment Company and the Furniture
Company were two separate and distinct corporations.
The officers of both companies were substantially the
same. The damaged furniture and furnishings and property of the Furniture Company remained in the premIses.
The plaintiff sued under the subrogation agreement
for the full rent, as the rate being paid before the fire
of $875.00 per month, for two full months after the fire.
The plaintiff offered no evidence whatever as to any
specific rental agreement, or as to the reasonable rental
value of the premises under the existing conditions, as
a basis for an implied obligation to pay rent. The rental
prior to the fire was $875.00 per month. The Oourt
entered judgment for the full amount of $875.00 per
month for two months, together with interest and costs.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The defendant filed this appeal, and has designated
and included the entire record, and all the proceedings
and evidence in the action, and in its appeal relies upon
the following points :
1. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion
for non-suit and dismissal {Tr. 99) on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to prove an agreement to pay
rent, or facts on which to base an implied agreement to
pay rent, and the reasonable rental value of the damaged
property.

2. There is no evidence in the record of any express agreement of the Furniture Company to pay any
rent and there is no evidence of the rental value of the
premises after the fire, or any evidence at all to support
Finding. of,Fact No.6 (Tr. 24). "That the agreed rental
was $875.00 pel' month,'' and Finding of Fact No. 9, ( Tr.
25), reading: ''The Court finds generally in favor of the
plaintiff corporation and against the defendant corporation.''
· 3. That there is no finding or ·evidence to support
the Conclusion of Law No. 1, that plaintiff is entitled to
a judgment. against the defendant in the ·amount of
$1,750.00.:
4. That the judgment awarding plaintiff $1,750.00,
and $262.50 interest, is unsupported by any ·evidence or
Finding of Fact, and is contrary to the evidence, and
there is no evidence on which to base any findings to
support the judgment.
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ARGU~IENT

The- pre-trial order (Tr. 15) specified that the only
issue of fact is the amount of use of the buildings described, in the premises that were destroyed by fire, that
was made by the defendant during the months of May
and June, 19-±6, and the only question of law presented
is as to whether a tenant of premises that are damaged
by fire, who makes use, or some use of the premises, is
liable for the full amount of the rent and the reasonable
rental value of the premises, or owes no rent at all.
In support of point one, that the motion for nonsuit should have been granted, the record affirmatively
shows there was an agreement that there should be no
rent obligation. (Tr. 50).
On the trial of the action before the Ron. John A.
Hendricks, Judge, Howard Christiansen, President and
Manager of the appellant Furniture Company, testified
(Tr. 42) that he was President of both the Rental Investment Company, owner of the premises, and the Furniture
Company, appellant tenant (Tr. 43); that the Furniture
Company occupied the premises as a watchman, to keep
track of what was left of the damaged merchandise, and
that on June 24 and 25, a fire sale was held, pursuant to
an advertise:ment in the Deseret News (Tr. 44); that the
Rental Investment Company made claims for loss of
rental against the Insurance Company in the amount of
$875.00 per month, and the Rental Investment Company
received a settlement on that basis for the months of May
and June (Tr. 45). On cross-examination, Mr. ChristianSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sen testified (Tr. 46) that a fire occurred May 2 at 2:15
A.M.; that when he got to the store the doors were broken in and everything went up like a flash (Tr. 46);
that the floor was covered with water; that the entire
walls were completely wrecked, with the plaster falling
(Tr. 47). The building was unsafe for customers to get
in or the general public; that he immediately contacted
the Insurance Company and then transferred the business over to a warehouse at 45 Richards Street, where
they set up operating headquarters (Tr. 48); that the
retail furniture business was not continued in the main
building; that the damaged merchandise was taken out,
and the Furniture Company merely kept someone at the
store to receive payments and send others to the tempocrary office, and signs were posted to make payments at
45 Richards Street, the new location (Tr. 49). The front
door was closed with canvas and boards, and the owner
of the building instructed the Furniture Company to
keep a watch at night, and there was an agreement that
the're would be no rent as long as the damaged premises
were unoccupied. The premises were unoccupiable during
the months of May and June (Tr. 50). The Rental Investment Company did remodel, as the owner of the
building. There was no agreement made at any time
to pay rent during May and June, and he was requested
not to move or disturb anything (Tr. 52). The officers
of both the Furniture Company and the Rental Investment Company, in a regular meeting, discussed the
matter of rent, and there was no request or demand made
upon the Furniture Company to pay, or meet any obligaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion for rent during the month of May or until full occupancy was resumed.
On re-direct examination, Mr. Christiansen testified,
giving the names of the officers of the Rental Investment
Company and of the Furniture Company, that the Furniture Company ceased doing business in the main store,
but did hold a fire sale, but there was no agreement between the owner and the tenant to pay Tent, the owner
making claim under its insurance policy for loss of rent.
The witness identified certain exhibits, E, F, G, H, I
and J (Tr. 5-±) as photographs showing· parts of the
damaged building (Tr. 56). W. H. Shipler testified as
to the exhibits, photographs taken by him (Tr. 58.) Howard A. Christiansen resumed the stand on further crossexamination (Tr. 58) and testified (Tr. 59) that after
the fire, on :May 2, negotiations were going on for settlement of a claim made by the Rental Investment Company
for loss of rent, and that the Furniture Company paid
rental to the· Rental Investment Company on the new
location in the warehouse, to which the business office
was moved the day following the fire. Scott Wetzel
testified (Tr. 60) as to the general condition of the building after the fire, and his negotiations for settlement, and
finally that the $4,000.00 paid under the insurance policy
to the Rental Investment Company (Tr. 65) was paid
as a compromise settlement of a claim for seven months'
loss of rent. He further testified (Tr. 67) that he had
seen merchandise in the damaged building, and at different times saw employees of the Furniture Company
in the store. The witness further testified (Tr. 75) that
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he was unable to make any agreement with respect to
fixing any amount of rental to be paid by the Furniture Company during any period after May 2, whi~h was
the date of the fire.
The matter went into litigation (Tr. 77), and (Tr.
78} liability under the policy was calculated on the basis
of the time required to repair the building. The $4,000.00
paid was on a basis of $875.00 a month for nearly five
months, on a basis of compromise settlement (Tr. 78,
There was a substantial amount of water through
the building, and sawdust was· placed on the floor to
absorb the water. The witness saw various different employees of the Furniture Company in the building (Tr.
80). He could not calculate how the agreed rental was
divided between the store and the warehouse property.
Mrs. Merrill testified (Tr. 82, 83) that she visited
the store on June 24 and saw people there, and purchased
some furniture at the sale.
Mrs. Hopkins testified that she was employed by
the Furniture Company (Tr. 88) and worked on the
accounts of the company with Mr~ Greenwood, that she
was there at the time of the fire sale, and saw the
accounts of the company at the store during the day, but
they were taken away at night, and that she saw (Tr.
90, 91) customers make purchases. She simply stayed
there to keep up contacts with customers.
Mrs. Ainsworth testified as to visiting the store after
the fire, and the location of the office desk and typewriter (Tr. 97).
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The plaintiff rested, and the defendant (Tr. 99)
moved for a non-suit, which was denied. Mr. Christiansen, a witness for the defendant testified (Tr. 101) as
follows:
The Furniture Company, at the time of the fire,
was occupying the 'building at No. 66 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, and was also leasing from the Rental
Investment Company warehouse space in the rear of the
furniture building, in no way connected with the retail
store on Richards Street, and paying therefore $125.00
per month. The whole Op€ration of the Furniture Company retail business was located in the Main Street store.
The Furniture Company had branch stores at Richfield
and at Ephraim. After the fire, it became necessary to
move the operations of the retail business to the warehouse at 45 Richards Street (Tr. 102), and a day or two
after the fire, the office equipment was moved to the
warehouse location at 45 Richards . Street. Customers
were calling for their furniture bought and left for repair, and other furniture in for repair, and to make payments. From the date of the fire on; the Furniture Company acted as a watchman for the premises. The matter
of the Furniture Company continuing in the premises
was discussed with the officers of the Rental Investment
Company, and there was no requirement or agr~emerit
that any rent would be charged or paid for the further
use or occupation of the premises by the Furniture Company (Tr. 50 and 106). The witness further testified that
he had been in the furniture business for many years and
had rented similar property in Salt Lake City,· and was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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familiar with the fair rental value of similar property,
and that under the conditions existing during the months
of May and June, 1946, the reasonable rental value of the
premises involved was $50.00 to $75.00 per month. The
windows and doors of the building were not closed, and it
would have been necessary to keep a watchman there at
all times if the Furniture Company had not stayed in the
premises and acted as a watchman (Tr. 108). The damage was extensive. Plaster was falling and walls were
cracked, so that everything had to be torn down and rebuilt. The Furniture Company got everything out, and
the contractor then started right out with the work,
without any delay on its account whatever (Tr. 109).
On cross-examination, the witness testified that at the
fire sale in June, about $2,000.00 to $2,500.00 in merchandise was sold (Tr. 110). The Furniture Company had a
policy of insurance for use and occupation (Tr. 116),
and was paid for loss under this policy, and the Rental
Investment Company was paid for loss of rental under
its policy. The Rental Investment Company determined what repairs and rebuilding would be done, and
the Furniture Company was paid under its business insurance policy for a loss of income. (Tr.118).
B. R. Greenwood, a witness called for the defendant,
(Tr. 120) testified that he was an employee of the Furniture Company, was familiar with the business and the
occupancy after the fire, that he was familiar with rental
values, and that in his judgment the reasonable rental
value of the premises during the months of May and June
was $50.00 to $75.00 a month.
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Earl B. Bennett (Tr. 129) testified that he was
employed as a shipping clerk and that he was called to
locate the electrical shut-off immediately, and that the
walls were damaged to the extent that it was not suitable
for continued use. The store was not used for anything
at the time, and all the business of the Furniture Company was carried on from the warehouse, except a fire
sale for a day and a half.

We have detailed the evidence to make clear the
basis of this appeal. The whole theory of the complaint
was damages for breach of contract of the Furniture
Company to pay rent. Paragraph 3 of the complaint
alleges that the Furniture Company ''occupied said
premises as a tenant under an oral month-to-month
rental agreement* * * *. '' The complaint then alleges
the fire, and that the Furniture Company ''continued to
occupy said premises as tenant,'' and further, that on
or about July 2, 1946, the Furniture Company "vacated
said premises, and ever since has failed and refused to
pay the agreed rental of $875.00 per month * * *. ''
We take the position that the evidence wholly failed
to establish any agreement, after the changed conditions
due to the fire on May 2, of the Furniture Company to pay
rent. The uncontradicted evidence of the witness, Christiansen, as above pointed out, is that there was no agreement to pay rent after the fire, and that no demand for
the payment of rent was ever made by the landlord. The
plaintiff therefore wholly failed in his proof, and the
Court should have sustained the defendant's motion for
non-suit and dismissal at the eiose of the plaintiffs eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dence. .The plaintiff sued. on the express. agreem~nt to
pay rent, and did J;lOt seek to amend his ple~ding t~ s~ek
a judgment on an implied agreement, and even ·if this
application to amend hadheen made, plaintiff had produced no evidence to justify or support such amendment
or recovery on the theory of implied agreement and
quantum meruit.
Passing on to points 2, 3 and 4, which we will consider and discuss together, that there was no evidence to
support the finding of an express agreement or an implied agreement to pay rent, and no evidence and no finding to support the judgment for $1750 rent for two
months, we again urge that the theory of the action
is breach of an express agreement, and that there is
no evidence to support this theory, all of the evidence
of the defendant on this point being to the contrary.
Again we assert that plaintiff did not seek to change
his theory and recover on a quantum meruit, and
again assert that even had he done so, there still was
no evidence in the record on which the Court could
find the reasonable rental value of the premises to
be $875.00 per month. Further, the Court did not attempt
to make any such finding. Surely, the bald Finding No.
9,- ''The Court finds generally in favor of the plaintiff
corporation, and against the defendant corporation,''
could not be so construed. 'The Court did close Finding
No. 6 with the words ''that the agreed rental was $875.00
p·er month.'' We refer back to our previous statement,
and re-assert that this is wholly without support in the
evidence ..
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We have been unable to find any case or principle of
law, applied, which could be pointed to as supporting
this judgment, and we seriously doubt that counsel for
responde:nt, applying even greater diligenc·e, can do so.
We find one analogy in the bankruptcy cases where, upon
bankruptcy, a lease is terminated and the Trnstee holds
over during the course of liquidation, as the Bankruptcy Act contemplates. The Courts there say that
under the changed conditions, the Trustee or Receiver
is obligated to pay only reasonable rent, and the agreed
rental in the lease is only some evidence of what is reasonable rent. We call the Court's attention to the case
of Crook v. Zorn, 100 F. (2d) 792, where the Court says:
''There being no express contract of rental,
and no claim that the relationship of landlord
and tenant existed, the rights of the parties are
fixed by law. Section 62 of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 USC A, Section 102, provides for payment
from the estate of the actual and ne~essary expenses incurred. * * * Necessa:ry expense in this
connection is the cost of preserving the property.
The full rental value of the entire building would
have very little weight in determining the amount
of this necessary expense, and there was no evi.,.
dence bfore the court below upon which to base
a finding as to a reasonable storage charge. There
being no claim for storage and no evidence tending _to prove what amount .would be fair and
reasonable in the circumstances, the Court did
not err in denying the rental claim entirely." ·
We refer the Court also to In re Millards, Inc., 41
F. ( 2d) 498. In this case, similar circumstances existed.
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The Receiver and Trustee occupied the premises after
bankruptcy, mainly for storage purposes, and the landlord presented a claim for rent on a basis of a lease.
The Court, in denying this claim and fixing a lesser
amount, stated, at Page 499:
''The fair rental value of such property
cannot be tested by its value for such a use or
for storage purposes. If storage was the only
purpose of retaining it, the stock might have
been taken to distinctly storage premises at very
much lower rate. Nor is it material that some
time would be required to prepare the property
for another tenant, or that another tenant was
not immediately on hand to take the premises.
There was no basis in the facts, nor under the
law, for applying the first year's rent rate under the lease to the period in question.''
We respectfully submit that each of the points of
error is well taken, and should be sustained, and the
judgment of the trial court reversed, with direction to
enter judgment in favor of the defendant with costs.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY,
Attorneys for /)efendant
and A. ppelloot.
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